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Michael Tooley has argued that personhood can be properly
ascribed only when an identifiable individual possesses: 1) the capability of desiring to live ; 2) the concept of self as a continuing subject of
experiences and other mental states; and 3) the belief that it itself is
such a continuing entity.l This theory of personhood is of interest
because it not only grants moral permissibility to abortion, but also
permits certain forms of infanticide. 2 Strict application of this theory
could give justification to the direct, intentional, free, voluntary, positive and knowledgeable killing of the insane, comatose and amnesiac.
In these cases, the ascription of personhood would not be permissible
because a concept of a continually existing self would be absent. And
even further, if Tooley is to be believed, it may be permissible to
ascribe personhood to some of the higher forms of animal life on the
grounds that they may possess the capabilities, concepts and beliefs
mentioned above . Because this theory purports to grant the freedoms
and protections of the right to life to many individuals who are not
members of the species homo sapiens, while at the same time imposing many duties and obligations of members of that species, it deserves
rather careful examination and attention.

1. At the outset, it must be noted that Tooley does not establish
any standards or criteria for determining the presence of the previMay, 1979
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ously mentioned desires, beliefs and capabilities. Procedures are not
set forth for determining when it is the case that members and nonmembers of the species homo sapiens possess these traits.3 This is a
rather serious deficiency because the absence of these procedures
makes it impossible to know to whom moral duties and obligations are
to be ascribed. It is also impossible to know what are the obligations
and duties of members of the species homo sapiens. If individuals who
cannot express syntactically and propositionally the content of their
mental states are going to be candidates for admission into the class of
persons, then criteria for determining the presence of the required
mental states must be established for fair judgments to be made.
Tooley did not consider the development of these procedures sufficiently important to be included in his work. And no developments of
these methods have been made by him in later works, which may
indicate the impossibility of establishing such procedures.
2. The entailments and implications of the right to life are not
clearly understood by Tooley either.4 The right to life grants security
and protection to those who refrain from direct, free, positive, intentional, proximate, voluntary and knowledgeable attacks on other valid
claimants of the right to life. 5 Persons and human beings are properly
entitled to this right because they can freely choose to comply with its
duties and obligations. But individuals who cannot choose to refrain
from these direct, intentional, free, voluntary, positive and knowledgeable attacks cannot be considered as valid claimants of the right to
life. Tooley correctlY criticizes views of the right to life which only
entail protection of the physical life of the individual. But the right to
life does not offer protection to this dimension of life alone. The right
to life is properly attributed to materially identifiable individuals
who possess the capability of asserting into publicly observable existence higher orders of meaning, moral value and logic in a knowledgeable and voluntary manner. The right to life protects the capability of
these individuals to continue the actualization of these states. A necessary means for such actualization is the physical existence and functioning of the individual. The right to life does not merely protect the
physical existence of the individual, for this is of no great moral
significance in and of itself without a direct relation to the states and
actions of the person. Rather, the right to life protects not only the
physical existence but also the structures and functions of the person's
states of mind. This means that actions which impair the operations of
the person are as impermissible as are those which impair the physical
existence of the person. Not only are abortion, murder and active
euthanasia prohibited by this principle, but also actions and procedures which impair the functionings of the person, unless they are
necessitated by other therapeutic procedures. Thus psycho-surgery or
other procedures which destroy the capability of the human subject to
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perform certain types of human action are prohibited. It is not morally permissible to act on a human subject in a manner that would
destroy the capability for expressing intentions, forming conceptual
thoughts, or using speech, for instance.
3. Tooley mistakenly grounds the right to life on the desire
of the individual for continued existence. Tooley's discussion focuses attention on the notion that the right to life is grounded
on the desire for continued existence, and that the frustration
of this desire is wrong. 6 It is not clear why there is a moral evil
involved in the failure to satisfy this desire. Desire itself is of
no relevant moral value, even if it is a desire for life itself. And this
desire is not directly and causally responsible for the assertion into
publicly observable existence of any higher moral orders. It is not
clear how the right to life is to be logically derived from the existence
of this desire in a subject. For it seems that a right which is absolute
and unconditional should be grounded on a more substantial basis.
The proper grounds for entitlement to the right to life should not be
an emotive or psychological state, but a state of being and should be
based on the worth and ontological condition of the claimant. But
granting the protections of the right to life on the basis of possessed
psychological or emotive states grounds the right to life on unstable
positivist and voluntarist grounds.
other Basis for Right to Life
Tooley's other basis for the right to life is the self-consciousness of
the individual and the individual's awareness of the relationship between the self and the external states of affairs. 7 It must be asked if
there is any moral value or good attached necessarily to the awareness
of this relationship or state of self-consciousness. It is not clear that
either of these psychological states is directly and immediately responsible for the existence of morally valuable states of affairs. An individual 's awareness of a causal relationship between an ego and certain
states of affairs is of no moral interest and is only of interest if the
individual possessing it is of a certain moral worth. For if an individual
possesses a certain worth, then these states of self-consciousness or
awareness acquire merit and value . But if the individual is not one of
significant worth, then these are of no value.
Tooley's problem is that he grounds the right to life on the value or
merit of the individual, but not on the worth of the individual. For
Tooley, the individual has to achieve a certain status, such as being the
causal agent of certain specific types of publicly observable events in a
direct and immediate fashion, before he can validly claim the right to
life. Thus, this right is grounded on the acquisition of certain capabilities , beliefs or dispositions which are not considered meritorious.
May, 1979
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Merits or values cannot stand as the grounds for the possession of
rights, but only for privileges. The right to life is an absolute and
inviolable one which requires a foundation that is stable and not subject to voluntary abolition. Self-consciousness and one 's awareness of
the relationship of the ego to other states of affairs can be voluntarily
abolished from existence in Tooley's scheme, and so destroy the
grounds for valid entitlement to the right to life.
Tooley 's self-consciousness requirement is ambiguous and inconsistently applied. 8 He does not wish to deny the protections of the
right to life to the comatose, sleeping, drugged or insane, but a strict
application of the principle of self-consciousness makes conferral of
the right to life difficult in these cases. When in these states, these
individuals lack a concept of a self as causally related to human mental
states. They are not the conscious and knowledgeable subjects of the
desire to continue existing in these states. But Tooley wants to provide them with the protections of the right to life on the principle that
they will soon come into full and proper possession of the states
required for valid possession of the right to life. The logical structure
of this theory would compel the disinterested analyst to ascribe the
protections of the right to life to the infant who also will come into
full possession of the states that are required for proper possession of
the right to life. Tooley, however, refuses to do this, and this remains
a conflict which he does not adequately resolve.
Tooley is not specific in what is entailed in and implied by the
self-consciousness principle. It is not clear if the ability to articulate
and assert into publicly observable existence in a knowledgeable manner that a self exists is what is entailed by this principle. It may be the
case that self-consciousness only refers to an awareness of external
forces operating in a causal relationship to one's existence. If the
former is what is entailed by the self-consciousness principle, then it is
doubtful that even fairly mature infants could be legitimately granted
the tight to life. But if the latter is what is entailed, then unborn
human life could be granted the protections of the right to life on
account of the fact that this awareness seems to be present at the
moment of genetic coding. If Tooley is to assert that self-consciousness is necessary for the proper ascription of the right to life, then
clarification of the content of self-consciousness should be provided.
4. It is claimed by Tooley that there is no reason to attach any
moral significance to differences in species, and that there is no reason
to limit the class of persons to the class of human beings. 9 With the
last part of this statement, I can agree, but not with the first because it
fails to see that some species lack the organic, morphological and
neurological facilities which permit the persons' states of mind to be
asserted into publicly observable existence. If the states of mind that
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are proper to persons are to be properly possessed, then the physical
capabilities permitting the assertion into existence of these states in a
publicly observable manner must b e present. Given our present knowledge of the universe, the only species which retains the organic, morphological and neurological structures permitting the mental states of
persons to be asserted into concrete and public existence is the species
of homo sapiens. If other species should be discovered to be in possession of these structures, then serious consideration would have to be
given to admitting these species into the class of persons. Possession of
these capabilities, however, would not be sufficient, for species must
also exhibit the ability to assert moral states of affairs into public
existence in a direct, intentional, voluntary and knowledgeable manner. If this requirement is also met, then there would be a strong case
for ascribing personhood to these species. Differentiation of species is
important in that only one species is presently known to have the
capability for freely, intentionally, voluntarily and directly asserting
higher orders or moral value , order and logic into concrete and public
existence.
5. In light of his refusal to offer the protections of the right to life
to some members of the species homo sapiens, Tooley's offer of such
protections to some non-members is logically incongruous. While it is
logically possible for members of other species to acquire the means to
assert the content of their mental states into existence and actualize
higher orders of moral value, this should not be considered a practical
possibility because of the inability of persons to confer on others the
ontological structures of personhood. It is not at all apparent that it is
within the capabilities of persons to form the structures which permit
syntactical and propositional speech, intentional expression and conceptual thought to be actualized in other individuals. And it is not
apparent that the ontological structures which permit the assertion of
moral values into public existence can be transferred to other species,
or actualized by them under their own power. Also, it is not clear that
the organic, morphological and neurological structures necessary for
the transformation of private mental states into publicly observable
states of affairs can be established in other species. In spite of these
difficulties, Tooley regards it as possibly permissible to ascribe personhood and the protections of the right to life to select members of
other species. Yet some members of the species homo sapiens who
have both the logical and practical possiblity of asserting their intramental and moral states of affairs into publicly observable existence in
the proximately present future are denied the protections of this right.
It is illogical to ascribe the protections of the right to life to individuals who lack the practical possibility of asserting these states into
public existence while refusing them to individuals who have both the
logical and practical possibility of actualizing these states. There is also
May, 1979
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an incongruity involved in the granting of admission into the class of
persons to individuals who have never expressed in an intentional,
syntactical and propositional manner the content of their states of
mind, while refusing this membership to individuals who have this as a
proximate logical and practical possibility.
Legal and moral problems are involved in granting personhood to
non-members of the species homo sapiens. If parrots or porpoises, for
instance, are to be granted membership in the class of persons on the
grounds that they have a desire for continued existence, a concept of
the self as the subject of mental states proper to persons, and the
belief that they are such a continuing entity, then they must accept
the duties and obligations that are proper to the class of persons. This
would mean that dogs would have to refrain from attacking mailmen,
and that parrots would incur guilt for uttering objectively false statements. There also remains the substantial problem of informing individuals such as these of their moral, social and civic duties . How these
problems would be faced is uncertain.
'Potentiality Principle'
6. The "potentiality principle" which Tooley claims to be the foundation of the conservative position is not clearly understood by him.
He argues that the potentiality principle ascribes the right to life to
the unborn because some trait is possessed potentially that will become actualized in adult life and warrant ascription of the right to
life. 10 This is not an accurate perception, however, for the properties
that permit the adult to validly claim the protections of the right to
life are possessed in their full actuality by the unborn. The right to life
is validly claimed by the individual of worth who has the capability of
expressing in an observable form of existence the content of mental
states which actualize higher orders of meaning, logic, order and moral
value. In the developing stages of life this capability is found, just as it
is found in the adult, for the developing stages possess this from the
moment of genetic coding.
Tooley's criticism of the potentiality principle rests on a misapprehension of the character of the distinctive traits of the person. He
appears to assume that intentional expression, syntactical and propositional speech and conceptual thought are actualized in the same way
that the capability for playing a musical instrument is actualized . The
capability for performing actions such as playing a musical instrument
is only actualized after voluntary consent is given. The traits of intentional expression, syntactical and propositional speech and conceptual
thought do not require voluntary consent for actualization . Persons
think conceptually by nature without reflection, judgment or consent.
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This signifies a radical difference between these capabilities and those
which require voluntary consent. Persons do not voluntarily choose to
attribute moral value to their human acts, nor do they choose to
attribute moral evil to acts of murder. The moral quality of their acts
is inherent to the acts themselves. Failure to see this distinction effectively reduces the properties that distinguish persons to just psychological properties. The difference between persons and other individuals is an ontological, not just a psychological difference.
7. It is contended by Tooley that the killing of the unborn is no
different in its morally relevant characteristics than killing kittens who
have been injected with a serum that provides them with the potentiality of developing into persons.ll He argues this by pointing to the
fact that there is nothing morally objectionable about refraining from
injecting the kittens with the serum. This is true. But from that point,
he asserts that there is nothing objectionable about an action which
would terminate the process by which these potentialities become
actualized. This is more difficult to accept. The case which he cites is
quite unnatural, and we cannot be sure that all of the relevant moral
factors are known. But if it is the case that the kitten is identical to
the unborn human person in all relevant moral aspects, then killing the
kitten would be morally prohibited. If the kitten were an individual of
inherent worth capable of expressing in a knowledgeable, free, voluntary, intentional manner the content of mental states actualizing
higher orders of meaning, logic, order and moral value, then the kitten
would have a valid claim to the protections of the right to life. But if
these properties were not actualized in the kitten, and were only
possible potentialities, then killing the kitten would not be prohibited.
For in this condition the kitten is similar to the human egg or sperm
which does not possess the capability for expressing in a publicly
observable manner the content of human mental states as an actualized potentiality. The possession of potentialities for existence as a
person alone is not sufficient for ascription of the protections of the
right to life. Only when the properties which are proper to persons are
actual within a materially identifiable individual and are enriching and
developing is it proper to ascribe the right to life.
Tooley fails to see that the person is onto logically prior to the
existence of the desire for life, the awareness of an ego standing in a
causal relations to mental states and the belief that one is such an ego.
These conditions cannot constitute a person, for the person must possess actual existence for the identification and ascription of these
traits. Without the prior existence of the person, any ascription of
these traits is incoherent. But if the person is fully actualized, then the
presence of these traits can aid in the identification and description of
the person.
May, 1979
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Doctors
I stand in awe of Doctors,
A circle esoteric indeed
Learnedly diagnostic, prognostic ,
With 'cl inical eye' to lead.
Vast the store of knowing and doing
Each scholarly brain to refrain,
To hold , pigeon-holed for
the "re nata" now;
Then to surface instanter again.
What a marvel, the surgical skills,
Confounding imagination
With sections 'ad extra and intra ,'
To a fraction of millimeters,
Precise in concatenation.
Our venturous mind,
Magnetic to our will,
May set upon a course to founder.
And here th e good Psychiatrist
Enters hopefully, with delicate skilL
A touchy, ad interim foot·noteJust remuneration due.
What price my pulsing stream of life?
Nor gold will purchase the sunshine,
Nor our life-giving air will renew.
We, most wondrous of works divine,
Must meet dread days of detrition ,
Our haven of hope, with the trust of a child,
This, - the Doctor's glorious mission.
- Fr. Walter Terence Doyle
Reprinted with p e rmission from Rehab Record, Sept. , 1975, Lawrenceville, N.J.

148

Linacre Quarterly

